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NOTES AND COMMENTS
eral Declaratory Judgment Act is not dear. Whatever discretion exists
is a judicial discretion subject to appellate review. 22 The Uniform
Declaratory Judgment Act, which has been adopted in North Carolina,
makes refusal of declaratory relief discretionary where the uncertainty
or the controversy giving rise to the proceeding would not be terminated. 2s There is no such provision in the Federal Act, and it has
been strongly contended that the federal courts have no power to refuse
to entertain jurisdiction in the exercise of a discretion not based upon
an established rule of law. 24 In the Quarles case the court takes the
position that it is implied that the granting of declaratory judgments
shall rest in the court's discretion, since the statute merely gives the
court power to grant the remedy without prescribing conditions under
which it is to be granted. The possibility that the useful purpose of
declaratory judgment statutes may be defeated by an abuse of judicial
discretion is a danger that should be carefully guarded against. In the
Quarles case, however, the granting of a declaratory judgment after an
action had been brought against the insurer was unnecessary, and the
decision is to be commended as an intelligent exercise of the court's
discretion under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act.
MOSEs BRAXTON GILLAM, JR.

Equity-Extent of Injunction Against Nuisances.
Plaintiffs petitioned to enjoin as a nuisance a roadhouse situated in
plaintiffs' neighborhood. A dancing pavillion was operated in connection with the roadhouse where music was continuously played, and
where patrons remained throughout the night cursing, gambling, drinking, and fighting. Notwithstanding the fact that some of the acts connected with the operation of the business were legitimate, the decree
granted by the court enjoined the operation of the business in its entirety.1
As shown by the principal case, a lawful business may become a
nuisance by reason of the manner of its operation. 2 In framing a decree
to enjoin such nuisances most courts in the absence of a statute hold that
there cannot be abatement to the extent of closing out the whole busiN.

BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934) 100.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT §6, 9 UNIFORM LAWS
C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §628(e).

2 UNIFORM

ANN. 127;

" Morrison, Availability of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act for Life
Insurance Cases (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 788, 791.
1

Hunnicutt v. Eaton, 191 S. E. 919 (Ga. 1937).
'Nevins v. McGavock, 214 Ala. 93, 106 So. 597 (1925) ; Junction City Lumber
Co. v. Sharp, 92 Ark. 538, 123 S. W. 370 (1909); Sullivan v. Royster, 72 Cal.
248, 13 Pac. 655 (1887) ; Gilbert v. Davidson Constr. Co., 110 Kan. 298, 203 Pac.
1113 (1922) ; Block v. Fertitta, 165 S. W. 504 (Tex. 1914) ; LEwIs AND SPELLING,
INJUNcTIONs (1926) §288.
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ness if a change in the character of its conduct will remove the evils.8
Only that part of the activity complained of which is offensive is enjoined, and the defendant may continue his business if it can be separately conducted in a harmless way. Thus the following businesses
were held to be nuisances, but the decree in each case was framed so as
to enjoin only the illegal uses of the premises: a dance hall where the
patrons used loud, profane, and vulgar language ;4 a shoe shine parlor
where the negro boys employed were noisy and boisterous ;5 a dairy
which caused noise, odors, and pests; 6 an iron works which caused
noise;7 a woodwork company where there was loud shouting of workmen and much smoke and noise ;s a filling station where there was noise
and confusion ;9 a poolroom where a large number of criminals, gamblers, and other low and dissolute characters congregated ;10 and a barbecue stand where the employees scuffled in a loud and boisterous
manner.'1
In declaring certain courses of action to be nuisances the legislatures
of many states have provided for injunctions of a more rigorous form
than those employed to suppress the above mentioned common law nuisances. Many states have passed statutes declaring houses of ill fame,
illicit liquor establishments, gambling houses, and other places which
foster conduct offensive to public morals to be nuisances.1 2 The statutes
may be roughly classified into the following two groups: 1. Where the
injunction is to be limited to the forbidden activity.18 2. Where the
entire business or place is to be dosed for all purposes.' 4 The statutes
of the vast majority of states including North Carolina are of the latter
class. Thus under these statutes courts have closed a cafe operated in
the same building with a house of prostitution,16 and an entire race track
'People v. High Ground
(1915).
'Kleising v. Miller, 83 S.
'Block v. Fertitta, 165 S.
'People v. High Ground

(1915).

Dairy Co., 166 N. Y. App. 81, 151 N. Y. Supp. 710
W. (2d) 732 (Tex. 1935).
W. 504 (Tex. 1914).
Dairy Co., 166 N. Y. App. 81, 151 N. Y. Supp. 710

'Collins
v. Wayne Iron Works, 227 Pa. 326, 76 Atl. 24 (1910).
8
Mackenzie v. Frank M. Pauli Co., 207 Mich. 456, 174 N. W. 161 (1919).
'National Refining Co. v. Batte, 135 Miss. 819, 100 So. 388 (1924).
"'Respass
v. Commonwealth, 131 Ky. 807, 115 S. W. 1131 (1909).
11
Pig'n Whistle Sandwich Shops v. Keith, 167 Ga. 622, 146 S. E. 455 (1929).
",ALA. CODEAN. (Michie, 1928) §§9280-98; ARU. REv. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer,
1928) §§2486-92; COLO. STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935) Vol. 2, c. 1, §§1-11; DE. REv.
CODE (1935) §§5272-80; D. C. CODE (1930) tit. 6, §§184-93; FLA. Coifp. GEN. LAWS
ANN. (1927) §7832; IowA CoDE (1935) §§1587-1618; PA. STAT. (Purden, 1936)
tit. 68, §§467-73; S. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) §§575-83.
1337 OKLA. STrAT. ANN. (1937) §73. The statute is discussed in Gragg v.
State, 73 Okla. 132, 175 .Pac. 201 (1918); Ford v. State, 109 Okla. 79, 234 Pac.
635 (1925) ; PA. STAT. (Purden, 1936) tit. 68, §§467-73.
§§5272"ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) §§9280-98; DEL. REV. CODE (1935)
80; FLA. ComP. GEN. LAws ANN. (1927) §7832; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1935) §§3180-87; S. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) §§575-83.
"People v. Smith; 48 Cal. 251, 191 Pac. 996 (1920).
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where only the betting on the horses was illegal.1 6 Some of the statutes
under this class provide that so much. of any building or structure as
may be entered through the same outside entrance shall be closed. 1 7 The
North Carolina statute and several others provide that the place enjoined shall include any building, erection, or place or any separate part
or portion thereof, or the ground itself.1 8 In none of these statutes of
the second class is the' deprivation of the use of the property absolute.
For the owner may apply to the court for permission to reopen, and if it
is satisfied with his good faith he may reopen his business by posting a
bond conditioned that he will immediately abate the nuisance and prevent its repetition for a period of one year.
Most of the acts specified in the above statutes were nuisances at
common law. But equity has been hesitant to enjoin nuisances where
the conduct was also a crime. Hence the legislatures have acted to reassure equity courts of their jurisdiction and to encourage them with a
more extensive weapon.
The court in the principal case reached its decision under its general
equity powers, and not by statutory provision. It is probable that the
extensive scope of statutory injunctions influenced the court in going
that far.
HARRY LEE RIDDLE, JR.
Fraudulent Conveyances--Dower Where the Conveyance Is Set
Aside-Interests of the Parties.
Plaintiff's husband, eleven months before their marriage, conveyed
real estate to his mother in fraud of his creditors. Whereupon a creditor brought an action to set aside the conveyance, and caused notice
of lis pendens to be filed. Plaintiff thereafter married the debtor, and
subsequently a judgment was rendered setting aside the conveyance as
to the creditor. After her husband's death the plaintiff claims dower
in this land against the defendants, the purchasers (and their vendees),
under a sale pursuant to the judgment in the action to which the wife
was not a party. Held, fraudulent conveyances are valid as between
the parties, and the plaintiff's husband was never beneficially seized
during coverture so that dower would attach.'
It is a generally accepted rule that an absolute conveyance of property in fraud of creditors is good as against all the world, except the
" Pompono Horse Club v. State, 93 Fla. 415, 111 So. 801 (1927).
CAL. GEN. LAws ANN.

(Deering, 1931) Act 6161, §1; COLO. STAT. ANN.

(Michie, 1935) Vol. 2 c. 1 §1.
" ALA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1928) §9280; DEL. REV. CoD. (1935)
D. C. CoDE (1930) tit. 6, §184; N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §3180.
'McLawhorn v. Smith, 211 N. C. 513, 191 S. E. 35 (1937).

§5272;

